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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
County," the state courts attempted to apply the original package
test to factually similar situations in which there were, in fact, no
"packages," while apparently ignoring the broader question of whether
the importer had so acted upon the goods that they had been incorp-
orated with the mass of property in the country. This narrow
approach has resulted in conflicting decisions which fail to shed light
on the basic question: when, for purposes of state taxation, do im-
ported goods cease to be imports?
ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS DRIVING DOES NOT BAR
PROSECUTION FOR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
After being involved in a fatal automobile collision, defendant was
charged by information, in a court of limited jurisdiction, with the
misdemeanor of reckless driving.' Trial by a three judge panel resulted
in acquittal.' Subsequently, an indictment was returned by county
grand jury charging defendant with vehicular homicide, a felony re-
quiring proof of driving in a "reckless or culpably negligent manner,
whereby a human being is killed."' Defendant contended that the
prosecution for vehicular homicide would subject him to double jeo-
pardy. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
granted an order prohibiting the trial, agreeing that it would necessar-
fly be a retrial of the charge of reckless driving.' On appeal, although
no more than three members of the New York Court of Appeals could
agree on a basis of decision, four of the seven judges voted for
reversal. Held: Acquittal of the misdemeanor of reckless driving, in
a court of limited jurisdiction, will not necessarily bar subsequent
prosecution in a court of greater jurisdiction for the felony of vehicu-
lar homicide, even though the latter crime requires proof that defend-
ant drove in a "reckless or culpably negligent manner." Martinis v.
27 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d 804, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
1 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 1190, provides: "Reckless driving shall mean
driving or using any motor vehicle . . . in a manner which unreasonably interferes
with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users
of the public highway. ...
2 The acquittal of reckless driving received both local and national publicity, in part
because defendant's father was then a judge of the court in which the trial took place,
though not a member of the panel that tried him. The trial also involved conflicts in
testimony which resulted in investigations of possible perjury. See New York Times,
July 2, 1963, p. 1, col. 3; New York Times, Aug. 3, 1963, p. 1, col. 3.
3 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1053-a provides: "A person who operates or drives any vehicle
of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is
killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death."
4 In re Martinis, 20 App. Div. 2d 79, 244 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963).
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Supreme Court, 15 N.Y.2d 240, 206 N.E.2d 165, 258 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1965).-
Both the New York and United States Constitutions prohibit suc-
cessive prosecutions for the "same offense."' Since protection is not
limited to successive prosecutions under a single statutory provision,'
the problem is to determine when two separately stated offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes. To meet this problem, most
courts employ some variation of the "same evidence" test, permitting
a second trial for the same act if each offense requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not.8 An adjunct to this test is
the "necessarily included offense" doctrine, which bars a second pro-
secution if there has been a prior acquittal of a lesser offense which
constitutes an essential element of the greater crime.' In cases in
which the "included offense" doctrine would seem to apply, the fact that
the initial prosecution took place in a court of lesser jurisdiction will
579 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1965).
0 U.S. CONST. amend. 5; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
7 People v. Barrow, 42 Misc. 2d 888, 249 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1964), and cases cited
therein; People v. Goldfarb, 152 App. Div. 870, 873, 138 N.Y.S. 62, 64-66, aff'd, 213
N.Y. 664, 107 N.E. 1083 (1926). For an explanation of the development of this con-
cept, see Lugar, Crimindal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv.
317, 319-29 (1954).
1 There are numerous variations of this test. See Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 132
(1947). Most well-reasoned decisions require each offense to have an independent
element. See, e.g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Lugar, supra
note 7. Under this test a defendant may be successfully tried for assault with a deadly
weapon and assault with intent to kill. Although both crimes require proof of the
element of assault, each also requires proof on an element independent of the other;
to prove assault with a deadly weapon it is unnecessary to show intent to kill, and
vice versa. But if the same evidence is necessary to prove both crimes, then the second
prosecution will be barred. See Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the
Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 608 (1961).
New York, despite a statute which proscribes successive prosecution for the "same
act or ommission" (N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1938) has applied the "same evidence" test.
People v. Barrow, 42 Misc. 2d 888, 249 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1964), and cases cited therein.
See People ex rel Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140 N.E.2d 282, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203
(1957).0 This doctrine is set out in ALI AD mN. CRim. LAw: DOuBLE JEopARDy § 17(1935). The necessarily included offense rule was developed to protect the defendant
in those cases where the commission of one offense necessarily requires the commission
of another offense, and that lesser offense has once been tried. The rule applies to
only a small number of cases, and categories covered by it remain uncertain. See
Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offcnse and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 529
(1949). The rule should bar a second trial if the state has failed, in the first trial, to
prove one essential element of the greater crime. No legitimate purpose can be served
by a subsequent prosecution where one essential element for conviction has already
been resolved against the state. The doctrine springs in part from the need for judi-
cial consistency. If a court of competent jurisdiction resolves against the state an
issue of fact or law essential to another crime, conviction of the latter crime would
render the former acquittal meaningless, and the decisions of the two courts would
necessarily conflict.
The lesser included offense doctrine, though recognized by New York courts(People v. Barrow, supra note 8, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 116), apparently was not applied in
that state prior to the principal case.
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sometimes bar a double jeopardy plea.' The "same transaction" test
disregards differences in statutory definitions and prohibits a second
prosecution for the same conduct." Regardless of the test used, it ap-
pears that the defense of double jeopardy has become increasingly un-
successful, 2 and that the related defense of collateral estoppel will be
only allowed in the most clear-cut cases."
Three judges in the principal case, in an opinion by Judge Dye, rea-
soned that, since the two crimes were based on unrelated statutory
schemes'4 and the first court had no jurisdiction over a prosecution for
the greater offense, the second trial would not constitute double jeop-
ardy. They concluded that although both charges arose out of the "same
transaction," they were different because they required different ele-
ments of proof. Three other judges, in a dissenting opinion by Judge
Fuld, took the view that reckless driving is an essential element of the
crime of vehicular homicide, and therefore a second trial would consti-
tute double jeopardy. Two of the judges who joined in this opinion
argued further, in a separate dissent, that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should apply to bar a second trial.' The seventh judge was,
10 People v. Herbert, 6 Cal. 2d 541, 58 P.2d 909 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Jones,
288 Mass. 150, 192 N.E. 522 (1934) ; Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178
N.E. 633 (1931) ; People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177 (1921) ; State v.
Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A2d 678 (1964) ; Commonwealth v. Bergen, 134 Pa. Super.
62, 4 A2d 164 (1939) ; State v. Empey, 65 Uath 609, 239 Pac. 25 (1925) ; cf. Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (dictum) ; State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226
S.W.2d 604 (1950). Contra, State v. Heitter, 203 A2d 69 (Del. 1964) (overruling
State v. Simmons, 48 Del. 166, 99 A.2d 401 (1953)) ; cf. State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30
So. 2d 744 (1947); People ex rel Kwiatkowski v. Trinkle, 169 Misc. 687 9 N.Y.S.2d
661 (City Ct. 1948). It has been suggested that one basis fo rdenial of the doublejeopardy plea, when courts are of unequal jurisdiction, is the existence of collusion
or "at least too great amount of defendant's initiative in bringing the case before the
lower jurisdiction." Kircheimer, supra note 9, n. 78. In People ex rel Kwiatkowski v.
Trenkle, supra, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 669, the state gave full-fledged consent to proceed before
the Magistrate's Court. In the principal case, the defendant "sought and had" a prompt
trial in the inferior court. 206 N.E.2d at 166, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 66 (Emphasis added).
11 See Comment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735, 743 (1959). The "same transaction" test
has been followed in Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. ALI, ADMIN.
CRim. LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 29-30 (1935). Lugar, supra note 7, n. 26, cites New
Jersey as consistently applying this test. It appears that this is no longer the case.
State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964).
12 See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). See Mayers & Yarbrough,
Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1960);
Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
'3 E.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
14 For a first offense, reckless driving, a misdemeanor, is punishable under N.Y.
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1801 by a fine up to $100 and thirty days imprisonment.
"Criminal Negligence in the operation of an automobile resulting in death," a felony,
is punishable under N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1053-b by imprisonment up to five years and
fine up to $1000.
15 The separate dissenters reasoned that since the fact of driving in a reckless or
culpably negligent manner was determined in favor of the accused, and since this fact
was essential to a finding of guilty as charged in the second indictment, the second
prosecution should be barred by collateral estoppel.
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on the record before him, unable to decide whether the second trial
would constitute double jeopardy. Judge Burke, concurring in denial
of the writ of prohibition, said that it was possible to convict of vehicu-
lar homicide without proving the crime defined in the traffic law, and
concluded that it would only be clear that double jeopardy had attached
if, at the second trial, the prosecution relied on proof of the "same in-
separable acts."
The first of two arguments utilized by Judge Dye in rejecting defend-
ant's claim of double jeopardy was that it would be a "travesty of jus-
tice" to allow a prior prosecution for a minor traffic offense to preclude
subsequent prosecution for a felony. The essence of this argument is
that prosecution in a court of inferior jurisdiction does not present the
element of harrassment which is traditionally prohibited by the doctrine
of double jeopardy." Traffic violations are tried quickly and infor-
mally, and punishment is minor compared to that fixed by the homicide
statute. In expressing these views, Judge Dye said, "A defendant
charged with a traffic offense in an inferior ... court.., rests secure in
the fact that he can only be prosecuted for a misdemeanor."'
This argument appears unsound in view of the explicit requirement
that reckless driving be proved for each crime. By statute, in New
York, "a conviction... [of the lesser charge in the principal case] shall
not be a bar to a prosecution ... for a homicide....""8 Therefore, if a
defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor, and a death had resulted
from his conduct, a felony prosecution could follow. In the second pros-
ecution, the prior verdict of guilt would at least be admissible 9 as evi-
dence of the reckless driving element of the homicide, and might be the
conclusive proof of that essential element."0 A defendant, therefore,
could find no "security" if the first prosecution was for a minor offense,
for-if he failed to put forth his full effort in that defense and was con-
10 This argument was successful in the following cases: People v. Herbert, 6 Cal.
2d 541, 58 P.2d 909 (1936) ; State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A2d 678 (1964); State
v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 33, 94 A.2d 493 (1953). Contra, State v. Heitter, 203 A.2d 69(Del. 1964) (overruling State v. Simmons, 48 Del. 166, 99 A.2d 401 (1953)). The other
cases cited in note 10, supra, though dealing with the question of prior prosecution in
a court of lesser jurisdiction, cannot validly be cited as supporting the view of Judge
Dye in the principal case, as they lack the element of acquittal, present in the principal
case, and the statutory requirement that "recklessness" be proved for both crimes.
"7 206 N.E.2d at 167, 258 N.Y.S2d at 68.1S N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFic LAW § 1800.
10 People v. Formato, 286 App. Div. 357, 143 N.Y.S.2d 205, 211 (1955) (dictum),
aff'd inere. 309 N.Y. 979, 132 N.E.2d 894 (1956).
Il0United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 622-625 (S.D.Cal. 1959);
People v. Mojado, 22 Cal. App. 2d 323, 70 P.2d 1015 (1937). There is little authority
on this point. See Gershensen, Res Judicata in Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 24
Bnoos.YN L. REv. 12, 26 (1958).
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victed-one essential element of the homicide could be established
against him.
Only if one kind of reckless driving were in some way different from
the other could a defendant "rest secure" in the lesser prosecution.
There is no meaningful showing of how the two kinds of driving might,
in fact, differ. Judge Dye suggests that the two statutory definitions of
reckless driving can be distinguished on the basis of result; one "inter-
feres" or "endangers" the users of the highway, and the other refers to
conduct "whereby a human being is killed." But this seems to be a dis-
tinction without a difference. "Endangers," as used in the traffic code,
could only reasonably be construed as referring to conduct which might
result in injury or death. The class to be protected is the same under
both codes, and no factual difference in conduct is suggested.2
Further, it would not seem unfair to the state to prohibit a second
prosecution. In the principal case it would have been possible at the
time of the first prosecution to indict for vehicular homicide, as all the
facts were known. The state might have delayed the midsdemeanor
trial pending prosecution for the greater offense.2 When the misde-
meanor trial is not delayed the state-rather than the accused-
should suffer the consequences. Otherwise, the state is allowed, in ef-
fect, to "test its case" at the expense of the defendant, knowing that it
may try again even if it fails to convict the first time.23
The second line of reasoning advanced by Judge Dye was that the
"same evidence" test, when applied, indicated that defendant was not
in double jeopardy. The opinion stated that, if "each case had an inde-
pendent element.., the state was entitled to its day in court on each
charge."24 However, the conclusion as to the application of this test is
unsound. Although the opinion pointed out that proof of vehicular
homicide requires an independent element, i.e., the killing of a person,
it failed to show the independent element needed for the reckless driv-
ing charge.
21 See the discussion in State v. Heitter, 203 A2d 69 (Del. 1964).
22 N.Y.C. CRier. CT. AcT. § 32 (Removal of misdemeanor cases). The problem is
more difficult if the state is powerless to prevent the misdemeanor trial. In such a
situation, a second prosecution would be more acceptable. This argument was made
to explain the result in State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 333, 94 A.2d 493 (1953). Bigelow,
Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 RuTGERs L. REv. 487, 505 (1957).
23 It could be argued that to permit acquittal in a cour tof lesser jurisdiction to be
the final determination of the issue of reckless driving would have the effect of
granting jurisdiction over the felony to the inferior court. The argument should not
be persuasive, as the choice as to which court may first try the defendant rests with
the prosecution.
24206 N.E.2d at 169, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71.
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Judge Fuld's dissent stated, in agreement with the position of the Ap-
pellate Division, that "reckless driving is an essential element of the
homicide.""- In view of the explicit wording of the statutes, and in
the absence of a showing that reckless driving as a misdemeanor is dif-
ferent from reckless driving as used in the homicide statute, it is sug-
gested that this is the result which should have been reached.
Judge Burke apparently applied the "same transaction" test. His
concurring opinion questioned whether the defendant had committed
inseparable acts made punishable by more than one statute. He argued
that if the state twice sought to prove the same act, defendant would be
twice in jeopardy. Judge Burke, however, was of the opinion that New
York law did not necessitate proof of the act of reckless driving in order
to gain a vehicular homicide conviction. His theory, apparently, was
that there is a distinction between acts which constitute "culpable neg-
ligence"-as used in the homicide statute-and those which constitute
reckless driving. It is questionable whether the New York cases support
Judge Burke's theory,- though support may be found in other jurisdic-
tions. 7 The problem in the principal case illustrates the difficulty of
defining "same transaction." Six members of the court considered de-
fendant's conduct to be a single incident. Judge Burke, however, was
willing-for double jeopardy purposes-to carve the conduct into
separate and distinct acts and allow the state at the second trial to
attempt development of a fine distinction between recklessness and
culpable negligence. Thus the "same transaction" test, normally con-
sidered to favor the defendant, here operated to the state's advantage
by permitting a second prosecution.28
The approach urged by Judge Burke will not necessarily protect the
defendant. As has been pointed out, the defendant's plea is based on
the policies that an accused should not be repeatedly harassed for the
same offense, and that a matter once judicially determined should not
be inquired into a second time. Yet Judge Burke permitted the second
trial on the theory that the state might prove a separate transaction.
2 5 Id. at 170, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 72.26Judge Burke relied on People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157
N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956), and People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.
2d 551 (1956). Neither of these decisions really distinguishes between recklessness and
culpable negligence.
27 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) ; Andrews v.
D.P.P., [1937] A.C. 576, 581-583. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
2 It is apparent that a rigid interpretation of either the "same evidence" or "same
transaction" tests may lead to restriction of double jeopardy protection. See Comment,
65 YALE L.J. 339, 348 (1956).
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If, at the second trial, the state failed to prove a second transaction,
the defendant would then have had to stand trial twice for the same
conduct, and basic policy objective would not have been met. Never-
theless, Judge Burke's approach could make it possible to, at least
partially, avoid such harassment. This could be accomplished by im-
mediately halting the second trial when it becomes apparent that the
state seeks to prove the same inseparable acts.29
The defense of collateral estoppel," urged by two dissenters, avoids
the limitations of double jeopardy treatment while achieving the policy
objectives which give rise to double jeopardy protection. Most courts
have held that collateral estoppel is available in criminal cases, 1 but
the defense is sometimes ignored or avoided when it conflicts with the
jeopardy determination." In the principal case, Judge Dye dismissed
the defense with little explanation or authority,3 even though it seems
clear that the doctrine has a place in the criminal law of New York. 4
Two reasons might be advanced why the state should twice be al-
lowed to attempt to prove the fact of reckless driving. First, it could
be argued that, since the defendant in a second trial could probably
contest the fact of reckless driving despite a prior conviction," the
state should be able to challenge a prior acquittal. This is the doctrine
29 This was not done in the principal case. At the second trial, it was not until
after the case had gone to the jury, and the jury had failed to reach a verdict, that the
trial court judge ruled-on the basis of Judge Burke's opinion-that Martinis was
twice in jeopardy. People v. Martinis, 46 Misc. 2d 1066, 261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct.
1965). The state will appeal. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
30 Collateral estoppel is essentially a procedural concept. "A party to a lawsuit is
estopped to assert or deny a given issue of law or fact because that question has been
determined in a previous lawsuit in which the party or someone in privity with him
has participated." Note, Collateral Estoppel In New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158
(1961). See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
31 See cases cited in Lugar, supra note 7, at 330.
32 In State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 333, 94 A.2d 493 (1953), the court ignored the
issue of collateral estoppel in making its determination. State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531,
197 A.2d 678 (1964), avoided application of the doctrine, but recognized that the de-
fense had merit in Martinis.
33 judge Dye's only reference to collateral estoppel was as follows: "Absent any
statutory or decisional law supporting petitioner's claim of double jeopardy, he may
not find a substitute by invoking principles of collateral estoppel. Nor may any anal-
ogy to principles of 'res judicata" in a civil suit be applied here. The situation of this
defendant is not at all like that of a party to a civil suit." 206 N.E.2d at 168, 258
N.Y.S.2d at 70. Judge Dye relied on Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). That
case is not analogous, as the defense in Hoag was thwarted because there was no way
of knowing the grounds upon which the jury had based its decision.
34 The dissenters relied on People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 200 N.E.2d 622, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1964), which suggests that the doctrine is applicable but refused to
apply it. See People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y.S. 538 (Nassau County Ct.
1912) ; Note, Collateral Estoppel in New York, supra note 30, at 1180.
3 5 People v. Formato, 286 App. Div. 357, 143 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1955) (dictum), aff'd
nere., 309 N.Y. 979, 132 N.E2d 894 (1956).
[VoL. 41
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
of mutuality, applied in civil cases.8" It is suggested that the doctrine
should not apply in criminal law. The basic policy consideration of
preventing harassment by the state, which commands superior re-
sources, overrides the need for mutuality of estoppel. 7 The second
factor hindering application of the defense of collateral estoppel is that,
without a special verdict in the first case, a dispute may arise as to
whether allegations at the second trial actually were in issue at the
first." This consideration is relevant in the principal case only if
Judge Burke's distinction between recklessness and culpable negligence
is accepted. Relying on this distinction, it would be possible to argue
that the ultimate fact of reckless driving was not being relitigated
in the second case. However, the New York courts have allowed intro-
duction of the record of the first trial for the purpose of showing the
scope of the issues there determined. 0 If this was possible in the prin-
cipal case, the absence of a special verdict would be no problem.
Further, Judge Burke's distinction was not adopted by a majority in
the principal case and, since the absence of recklessness had been finally
determined, the state should have been estopped from attempting to
prove it again.
Underlying the opinions in this case are conflicting views as to pri-
mary policy considerations. The question was whether prosecution for
a traffic offense presents the element of harrassment that the law tra-
ditionally prohibits. Prompting this argument is concern that, too often,
defendants escape just prosecution through technicalities, and that,
since the state is denied appeal when there has been an acquittal,40
courts should be more willing to permit second prosecutions in order
to prevent avoidance of well-merited punishment.4'
Serious doubt exists as to whether the above considerations should
lead to restriction of double jeopardy protection, even when the equities
seem to demand such restriction. A defendant should not be subjected
30 See Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Ericson v. Slomer,
94 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Schafer v. Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N.E.2d 963 (1938).
3 See discussion in Comment, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 28 U. CHi. L.
Rmv. 142, 149-51 (1960).
3s See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) ; People v. Pearson, 120 Misc.
377, 199 N.Y.Supp. 488 (Nassau County Ct. 1923) ; Kirchheimer, supra note 9. But see
Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) ; United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d
466 (3d Cir. 1943).
39 People v. Rogers, 184 App. Div. 461. 171 N.Y.Supp. 451 (1918).
40 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 518. Denial of the right to appeal an acquittal is based
on the double jeopardy doctrine. People v. Tallman, 193 Misc. 563, 84 N.Y.S2d 359(Herkimer County Ct. 1948).
11 For argument favoring restriction of double jeopardy protection, see Horack,
The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1937).
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to the expense, effort and anxiety of a criminal defense 2 when he has
been acquitted, in a court of competent jurisdiction, of an essential
element of the crime. The prosecution should not be tempted to pro-
ceed with an incompletely prepared case, knowing it will have the
opportunity to try again. To allow this approach is to defeat certainty
in criminal law and foster disrespect for the judicial system. Most of
the problems in this and similar cases of successive prosecutions could
be avoided by requiring the state to charge, in a single indictment,
all offenses growing out of the same transaction.43
LOSS CARRYOVERS UNDER TILE 1954 CODE:
REJECTION OF THE LIBSON SHOPS DOCTRINE
Taxpayer corporation, which had sustained losses in the hardware
business, entered into an agreement with two partners engaged in
real estate development whereby a department of real estate develop-
ment was established within the corporation. Funds needed for the
department's operations were furnished by the partners through the
purchase of non-voting preferred stock valued at approximately two-
fifths of the total value of the corporate stock. By the terms of the
agreement, ninety percent of the profits of the department were to
be distributed to the preferred stockholders. Voting control of the
common stock was placed in a voting trust. Thereafter, the hardware
business was discontinued and the real estate department operated
at a profit. In filing income tax returns, the corporation offset the
past losses of the hardware business against profits of the real estate
department. The Commissioner's disallowance of the loss carryover1
was upheld by the Tax Court on the basis that there was not the
continuity of business enterprise between the hardware business and
the real estate development required by the so-called Libson Shops
doctrine.2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
42 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).43 This is the solution adopted in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).
1 Net operating loss carryovers permit a form of income "averaging" by allowing
a corporation to reduce taxable income in a profitable year by offsetting losses of prior
years. Section 172 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 provides that a net operating loss
can be carried back as far as the third year preceding the loss, and offset against tax-
able income of those years. If this carryback does not absorb the loss the remainder
may be carried forward for as many as five years. See generally Brody, Net Operating
Loss Deduction, 34 TAXES 325, 326-38 (1956).
2 See text accompanying note 14 infra.
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